( Kapital-i, in 'I, myself', now spels Il as in isle or aisle.
Leter y spels ryd for reed or read and partys for parties.
Leter w spels swn for soon. )
Links to sektions:
The Explanatory Power Of Transferabl Voting:
This is evidens presented, but not aluded-to, by the independent komision of 1998, other than by leter, as an 'extremely interesting submission.'
The komision's report refers to organisations, politicians and akademiks, as wel as several pajes listing 'interlocuters' from forein kuntrys.
The others wer held to be tu numerus to mention. The number was not even mention'd. I kud not find even the naim of uon ordinary member of the publik -- a myr voter -- aknolej'd by the Voting Komision ( in the Stationary Office edition of the Jenkins report ).
The komision was supos'd to be open to the jeneral publik. But not so much as uon extrakt from ther riten submisions was thot worthy of inkluding in ther 'Key Evidence'.
This konsisted entIrly of the koments or studys from thos of power or influens, wich evidently was al that wei'd in the minds of the komision, despIt the report's repyted protestation they gav 'most'
or 'very serious consideration' to the dedikated suport for STV. Not that ther wasn't mor than ampl, in the Ky Evidens, to point the komision in that direktion.
The efekt of this komision on ordinary pepl, for hws benefit it is supos'd to be konsern'd, must be to konklud that taking an interest in oficial studys is a wayst of tIm and efort.
The 4 main mesurment skails defin the singl transferabl vot as sientifik method of elektions.
Party-proportional kounts jeneraly lak the midl tw, the ordinal skail, given by a preferens vot, and the interval skail of transferabl vots in surplus of a quota. This lak explains wI party list systems hav no koherent principl of elekting individuals.
LIkwIs, kombining simpl majoritys with lists yuses only the first and forth skails, the klasifikatory skail ( for uon person uon vot ) and ratio skail ( for proportion ) without the lojikal progresion thru the other tw skails.
STV kontains for lojikly posibl kinds of PR: 1) with respekt to partys, prefering partisanship, primarys, ko-alitions, referendums.
And lIkwIs: 2) with respekt to quotas betwyn, within, akros and without konstituensys.
As propos'd, STV satisfys 6 ( and potentialy al 8 ) of thys kinds of PR.
The singl member system has uon kind ( PR betwyn konstituensys ).
( Lokalis'd multi-member konstituensys ofer the most konvenient and akurat 'jeometry' of historik komunitys. )
List systems hav tw kinds of PR: betwyn partys ( partisanship ), and, without konstituensys.
So, kombin'd systems averaj betwyn uon and tw kinds of PR.
STV ofers komprehensiv PR proper, as a theory of relativ chois that konsistently jeneralises the vot and kount, from the simpl majority system of uon-preferens vot for uon-member majority kount, to many-preferens vot ( of order'd chois ) for many-member majority ( Droop quota ) kount.
Mill's demokrasy gos beyond absolutist skisms from 'maiorokrasy' or proportional partisanship.
A deduktiv explanation of elektions ofers a praktikal konsiliation of unity ( or fraternity ) in liberty, thru the prinsipl of equality in transferabl voting, that proportionaly represents al grup atributs by individual preferens.
Aditional Members wer an ad hok atempt to saiv disproportionat first past the post elektions as a konstituensy system, that fail'd bekaus of the anomalys from sekond ( or third ) past the post MPs.
So, the establish'd AMS of the Dubl Vot was falen-bak on. A sekond X-vot for party list portions of syts reduses the number of singl-member monopolys that bekom mor disproportionat and mor polaris'd. This kombin'd system of inkonsistent axioms is inherently unstabl ( most klyrly failing the test of Euro-elektions ).
This kompensated partys system denIs the publik nolej thru frydom of chois from PR of individuals and ther-by other grups in sosiety ( failing, for instans, independents and independens, most obviusly in lokal elektions ).
For jeneral elektions, the Duble Vot has an ad hok threshold to supres the konsistent aplikation even of its party-privilej'd proportional kount, lest smal partys hold ko-alitions to ransom.
The Dubl Vot is a partikular patch-up not a truly jeneral theory of chois. Separat 'personal' and 'party' vots deny a proper 'kontrol' in the elektoral test of personal chois in relation to party chois.
In terms of Britain's 'saif syt' system, the aditional list members ar a sekond saifty net for fail'd kandidats and fail'd partys, tardily and unstably going thru al the ( unprefer'd ) ko-alition kombinations.
Or, just a third party, perhaps, is squyz'd by the tw-party system of singl members. Yet the main partys kan not govern without this konfirm'd stwj in the Dubl Vot system. Unles they kut out the midl-man, this vulnerabl, bekaus narowly undemokratik, bais for a king-maker chwses wich unstabl kors to tak, by way of suksesiv left or rIt wing ko-alitions.
The Dubl Vot denIs basik elektoral rIts of individual chois and elekting a government.
'Siens Is Mesurment'.
And to giv the gaim away rIt away, only uon voting system folows the 4 main skails of mesurment, nown to siens.
For Sidney Siegal, the usual problem of the behavioral sienses is, lIk fysiks, to go beyond the first tw skails ( wich his bwk on non-parametrik statistiks is mainly about statistikal tests for ). And koming to the hundreds of voting methods, that hav byn invented, al -- but uon -- mis out, typikaly tw of the mesurment skails.
But the for skails ar bilt-up by lojikal progresion, and the usual omision, of the midl tw skails, renders thos voting methods unsientifik. The praktikal kritisisms justly brot against them, stem from that mising mensural information.
1) The Nominal Skail: The Spot Vot.
The first skail of mesurment is the klasifikatory or nominal skail. 'Uon person uon vot' klasifys al adults as voters. Every-uon is at lyst nominaly represented. Hens, the chivalrus tradition that a singl member wil work for al his konstituents, inkluding thos hw did not want to be sadl'd with him. He is ther nominal or naim'd representativ but not nesesarily hw they aktualy voted for.
X marks the spot givs rIs to a tw-party system bekaus it kan only expres a singl preferens betwyn uon of tw kandidats, in a system of singl member konstituensys. But British voters hav sot mor than the simplest tw-way chois, wich is al this system afords.
Even a myr tw-party chois of government sufers alredy from a fatal defekt. Equal elektorats ar no garanty against dis-proportionat results. Uon party may pIl up huj majoritys. The other party may slip first past the post to win mor syts with fwer wasted vots. ( Sy Enid Lakeman: 'How Democracies Vote.' ) That was how the minority won twIs in South Afrika, resulting in the unkonstitutional Apartheid rejym.
2) The Ordinal Skail: The Alternativ Vot.
To top.Mor than tw kandidats poses the dilema of giving a singl-preferens X-vot either to uon's first preferens or a sekond preferens with a beter chans of kyping out a lyst prefer'd kandidat. It is the familiar pwr chois betwyn a wasted vot or a taktikal vot.
Elektions ar a test of publik opinion. Sientifik method aplIs to the elektoral test as to any other sientifik experiment. Experimenters kontrol any chans faktors that mIt obskur the law, wich explains the results they ar lwking for. In the experiment of an elektion, the law to be observ'd is the law of a majority kount, in terms of wich the results of the voting ar elektivly understud.
( We wil show the konsept of a majority kount jeneralises to inklud proportional kounting, and bekom a jeneral law of the kount. )
Experimental kontrol is given the voters, by replasing the uon preferens spot vot with a many-preferens vot for kandidats in number order of chois: 1, 2, 3, etc. This is simply kal'd preferens voting. An order'd chois is on an ordinal skail of mesurment.
The 'kontrol' is of the chans of split voting betwyn tw kandidats, uon of hwm mit be mor prefer'd than a third kandidat, wining mor vots than either but les than both. To no the truth of the mater, it is nesesary to kontrol such kontinjensys, wich obskur the law of majority elektion, that dosn't depend on the chans of uon of the lwsing kandidats not standing down.
Indyd, the Sekond Balot system oblijes the kandidat, with the fwest spot vots, to stand down, to alow his voters to kontribut to an other kandidat's ryching an over-al majority. This alowans of an order'd chois is, in demokratik terms, a preferential sufraj, and, in sientifik terms, a preferential kontrol.
The Alternativ Vot efekts a Sekond Balot, or as many suksesiv re-distributions of the vots from eliminated kandidats as it taks, to find the over-al majority kandidat.
Churchill kal'd this proses of elimination 'the worst vots for the worst kandidats'.
The short anser is that the saim argument aplIs with mor fors to the spot vot. A chois betwyn a wasted vot or a taktikal vot is betwyn yusing the spot vot as a first preferens or a sekond preferens. DenIing the publik a preferens vot dos not abolish the reality of relativ chois. It only degraids the publik's frydom to expres it. Thus the X-vot maks som voters yus a wors vot for a wors kandidat than they nyd do with a preferens vot.
So, Churchill's famus freis aplIs mor to the spot vot than the preferens vot. ( As a Liberal, he admited to the Proportional Representation Sosiety that the Singl Transferabl Vot is 'excellent in theory' but myn-wIl wud suport the Sekond Balot. Tho, returning to the Torys, he opos'd the Alternativ Vot. )
Maude and Szemerey ( 'Why Electoral Change?' ) nout a further objektion to preferens voting as 'sirkular'. Som permutations of preferens voting may kansel ych other out:
| Voter | lst | 2nd | 3rd |
| A | Labor | Konservativ | Liberal |
| B | Liberal | Labor | Konservativ |
| C | Konservativ | Liberal | Labor |
This set of preferenses revers'd wud also kansel ych other out, making tw self-kanseling sets. Thys kover al six permutations of preferens betwyn thry kandidats. But taking ych preferens from uon set, and replasing it by ych of the preferenses, in turn, from the other set, yu get thry tIms thry nw sets of preferenses, in both the orijinal sets (or 3 × 3 × 2 ) equals 18 non-kanseling sets of preferenses.
Kompar that with having only a singl-preferens spot vot. This myrly minimises the amount of preferential information about voters' choises. The truth is not improv'd by supresing parts of it uon dosn't lIk, to redus it to a spot vot for a tw-party system:
Voter A for lst: Labor, 2nd: Konservativ.
Voter C for lst: Konservativ, 2nd: Labor.
Hyr ther is only uon posibl set of preferens permutations and it is a self-kanseling set. So, kontrary to objektion, the mor preferential the voting, the vastly dekrys'd the probabilitys of turning up sirkular or self-kanseling sets of preferenses.
3(i) The Interval Skail ( Aswm'd ): Borda's Method.
Borda's method antisipated Churchill, by giving the lyst weit in the kount to the lowest preferenses or 'worst vots'. UnlIk the Alternativ Vot, Borda's method ( 1770 ) maks standard mathematikal yus of al the preferential information, weited relativ to order of importans.
Weiting with the harmonik serys kounts 1/1, 1/2, 1/3 etc for ych lst, 2nd, 3rd etc. preferens, respektivly. Thys ar asswm'd valus at wich the strenth of voters' fylings for kandidats perhaps fals off.
( At any rait, weiting with the arithmetik serys perhaps over-emfasises, as the jeometrik serys wud under-emfasis, the importans of leser preferenses, as the number of kandidats inkryses. )
Borda's method was the first atempt to over-kom the 'Condorcet paradox' ( wich has a bering on Churchill's aforism ). With equaly weited preferenses, the lyst prefer'd of thry kandidats, in the first round, mIt be the most prefer'd on the sekond preferenses of voters for the lyding tw kandidats. This kan produs a kontradiktory result to the Alternativ Vot or Exaustiv Balot, inkluding its limited version, the Sekond Balot, wich eliminats kandidats with the lyst first preferenses.
3 (ii) The Interval Skail ( Ryl ): Gregory's Method.
To top.In simpl statistiks, interval weiting myns taking into akount the number of items, in ych klas of an order'd tabl of data, to ariv at a rational averaj. Wen it is not nown how many items ther ar in ych klas, the number may be asum'd. This is akin to Borda's asum'd kount. Wen it is nown, we hav a ryl interval skail, as is the kais with Gregory's method ( 1880 ), yus'd as 'the Senatorial Ruls' in som Komon-welth kuntrys.
This is wI Gregory's method super-syds Borda's.
UnlIk Borda's method, sekond or leser preferenses kan not kount against the elektion of first or greiter preferenses.
In singl member konstituensys, a wining kandidat usualy has a marjin of redundant vots over thos just nyded to elekt him first past the post. This surplus vot is the interval betwyn his total vot and his elektiv vot. Gregory's method maks surplus vots transferabl for the elektion of sekond or next preferenses in a multi-member konstituensy.
But al the first-elekted's voters ar equaly entitl'd to a preferential say in the re-distribution of his surplus vot. For exampl, supos 100 vots is enuf to elekt kandidats but the most popular kandidat resyv'd 160 first preferenses, a surplus of 60 vots. Ther ar 160 voters equaly entItl'd to prefer how the surplus weit of 60 vots shud be re-distributed. So, al 160 voters' sekond preferenses ar weited at 60/160 = 3/8 of a vot, ther 'transfer valu'.
Say 80 out of 160 transferabl vots went to the saim sekond preferens, giving him vots to the valu of 3/8 × 80 = 30 vots. If that kandidat alredy had 70 or mor vots, he wud now hav the 100 vots to bekom the sekond elekted kandidat in a multi-member konstituensy.
The surplus vots from the most prefer'd kandidatss, with transferabl voting, is the lojikal oposit of defisit vots from the lyst prefer'd kandidats, with the Alternativ Vot, 'the worst vots for the worst kandidats'. Then, transferabl voting must be the best vots for the best kandidats, for Churchill's katch-freis to hav any myning.
4) The Ratio Skail: The Droop Quota.
To top.Given best vots for best kandidats, by transferabl voting, Churchill's other kleverest of elektoral sayings implIs its multi-member konstituensys: I wud rather be uon-fifth of the representativs for the houl of Leeds than uon representativ for a fifth of Leeds. This preferens is worthy of the myning of the Hous of 'Komons' or komunitys. Wer-as the singl member system has turn'd parliment into a Hous of Monopolys.
Elekting uon member with haf the vots ( or just over ) is only the first in a rational serys of posibilitys. Tw kandidats kan be elekted on quotas of uon-third the vots ych, for a proportional representation of tw-thirds the voters in a tw-member konstituensy. Thry konstituensy syts ar won on quotas of a quarter the vots ych, proportionaly representing thry-quarters the voters. And so on.
This rationalisation of representation is nown as yusing 'the Droop quota' ( 1869 ).
Vots in surplus of a quota ar transferabl by Gregory's method. If al surplus vots hav byn transfer'd and any syts remain to be fil'd, then the kandidat with lyst vots stands down for re-distribution of his next preferenses.
This standard prosedur eliminats al but the most residual kind of taktikal voting. For formal korektnes, Brian Meek and later D R Woodall ( 'Representation,' Journal of the Electoral Reform Society, Vol. 23 no 90 ) work'd-out an exaustiv komputer kount for transferabl voting. The result kan be chek'd with a kalculator.
Roger Penrose ( 'Shadows Of The Mind' ) warn'd of komputer fraud in elektions.
Transferabl voting shud be lyst vulnerabl, as a national komplex of individual preferenses. Wer-as list totals of 'party' vots mIt only nyd a nuj uon way or the other to falsify the result desisivly.
To sum-up, we hav related a koherent elektoral prosedur by folowing the for main skails of mesurment, in: 1) a klasifikation in terms of uon person uon vot; 2) the uon vot is in order of preferens; 3) ych singl vot is transferabl in that order, to the interval valu of surplus vots over the quota, wich is 4) the Droop quota, an elektiv ratio of vots to syts in a multi-member konstituensy.
In fakt, we hav just defin'd an existing elektoral system nown as proportional representation by the singl transferabl vot. Therfor, STV/PR is the sientifik method of elektions.
The lojik of mesurment shows-up the deficiensys of non-transferabl voting systems. An X-vot for uon of tw partys in a singl member system is the lyst mesur'd system of elektions, ofering the lyst chois.
Prof. David Butler's evidens to the Jenkins Komision show'd that for a singl syt elektion betwyn mor than tw kandidats, the alternativ vot is not mensuraly akseptabl, as I had asum'd.
How-ever, Alternativ Vot or Exaustiv Balot ofer a ful order of chois kompar'd to the Sekond Balot or Suplementary Vot ( rekomended by the Plant report ) only ofering a first and sekond preferens ( or, rather, a tw-preferens vot, not nesesarily first and sekond chois ).
Borda's method, unlIk the Alternativ Vot, atempts to akount for the relativ importans of preferenses, with an asum'd interval skail weiting. It is worth emfasising that, for developing the sientifik mesurment of elektions, multi-member konstituensys ar esential, as Gregory's method of ryl interval skail weiting mesurs the way voters' later preferenses aktualy do dekrys in importans.
Systems of 'PR', that ar only bais'd on a party-proportional kount of the spot vot, jeneraly lak both the ordinal skail of mesurment in preferens voting and the ( ryl ) interval skail in ( Gregory's method of ) transferabl voting.
That is wI party list systems hav no prinsipl'd myns of elekting individual kandidats. The fault remains wen lists ar kombin'd, with a singl member system, to giv Aditional Members.
Aditional Member Systems, such as the German Dubl Vot, ar unsientifik. The first vot klasifys uon person with uon chois for a representativ's majority. The sekond vot kounts proportional partisanship in ratios of syts to party vots. The klasifikatory skail shud progres thru the ordinal and interval skails to the ratio skail. Insted, the Dubl Vot tryts its myr tw skails as tw separat systems.
It brings to mind the proverbialy blind-folded visitors pronounsing on the odest menajery, ryly the diferent parts of an elefant.
The German Dubl Vot and the Italian konstitutional reforms of the 1990s, also introdusing singl member konstituensys, wer mis-konsyv'd atempts to stabilis Kontinental rationalism with British empirisism.
The uon-sided filosofys of British empirisism and Kontinental rationalism ar reflekted in ther respektiv Komon Law and Roman Law. This separat tradition of understanding ther afairs is also found in ther respektiv voting systems. Most English-spyking kuntrys stik to the ( limited ) evidens of an X-vot for an individual kandidat first past the post, resulting in rationaly 'wasted' vots. Wer-as, main-land Europ atempts to solv this problem with a dogmatik rationalism of proportional partisanship, disregarding hw the voters' most prefer'd individual kandidats mIt be.
Siens is a working partnership in empirikal rationalism. Rational system and empirikal investigation work beter together. The singl transferabl vot ( STV ) givs greiter evidens in a houl order of individual chois, that is a preferens vot. And STV is mor rational than a partisan kount. The STV kount preferentialy rationalises chois not only betwyn partys but within partys, akros partys and out-sId partys. This system widens the frydom to no publik opinion.
1) With Respekt To Partys.
A gud sientifik theory of chois is juj'd by the ranj and power of its explanations. STV analyses the 4 lojikly posibl ways to konsider individual chois in relation to party suport: chois betwyn, within, akros and without partys.
The 4 relations korespond to the 4 skails of mesurment.
Chois betwyn partys klasifys chois into party choises.
Chois within partys orders chois of party kandidats.
Chois akros partys is akros party intervals on the politikal spektrum of unykly individual 'kolors' of kandidats. The 'intervals' ar the brodly rekognis'd party kolors, 'Reds', 'Gryns' etc.
Chois without partys, of independents ( or independent-minded nominys ) for non-politikal ( aspekts of ) elektions, is posibl on a ratio of vots per syts for individual kandidats, rather than party lists.
Thys 4 relations of party to personal chois may be familiarly naim'd, as:
1)partisanship, by prefering several kandidats al of the saim party.
Exampl: A divided komunity wil show litl kros-party voting, tho even in Northern Ireland it is not inkonsiderabl, and STV is the only system that impartialy permits the links as wel as the breks to show.
2)primarys, by prefering sertain kandidats to others of the saim party.
Exampl: The Plant report komplain'd of the hI turn-over of MPs in ych Irish party bekaus of intra-party kompetition. As Maude and Szemerey say, 'There are no safe seats with STV.'
3)ko-alitions, by prefering the kandidats of the partys most agryabl to ych other, ensuring the prefer'd majority government, by mor than uon party, if nesesary.
The mor independent-minded the kandidats prefer'd, the mor individualist the parliment, as up to the nIntynth sentury. The mor konsensus kandidats ar prefer'd, the mor national the government, as in emerjensys, lIk war.
Exampl: Fine Gael and Irish Labor suksesfuly ask'd ther voters to extend ther preferenses to partner kandidats.
4)referendums, by prefering kandidats of diferent partys or independents on som question of individual konsiens or national destiny.
This rekognises the growth of singl-isyu kampains out-sId the party system. Inkluded ar the sivil rIts movments for the representation of social grups other than party, such as aij, sex, rais, klas, kryd, tung, trIb or jobs etc, in the desir'd kombinations individualy prefer'd by the voters.
Exampl: In 1922, regardles of the tw main pro- and anti- partys' pakt, the Irish pepl wer abl to order a chois of several pakt and non-pakt kandidats, in multi-member konstituensys, akording to ther position on the Anglo-Irish tryty. So, a ( larj ) majority wish pas'd into government and the sivil war kud be ended.
For politikal aktivists only konsern'd with the rivalry for power betwyn partys, party lists or list-kombin'd systems of proportional partisanship, deseptivly kal'd 'PR', wer as gud, or beter for ther purposes, than a komprehensiv proportional representation, not only betwyn but within, akros and without partys, aforded by transferabl voting.
2) With Respekt To Konstituensys.
To top.Ther ar 4 relations of preferens voting with respekt to partys. Les wel apreciated stil, for purposes of elektoral reform, is that thys 4 relations also hold for the quota count with respekt to konstituensys.
PR Betwyn Konstituensys myns the number of syts per konstituensy ar in proportion to the number of elektors per konstituensy. The 1979 Tory government's equalisation of elektorats was a PR betwyn konstituensys ( but not within them ). But PR kan be betwyn multi-member konstituensys. In fakt, the konstituensys don't even hav to be a uniform system.
For exampl, the PR kan be betwyn uon-member konstituensys of, say, 73,000 elektors ych. ( Dividing nyrly 44 milion British elektors by about 600 MPs; thys figurs ar only aproximat. ) Or, PR kan be betwyn tw-member konstituensys ( the historik English system ) of 2 × 73,000 = 146,000 elektors ych; or thry member konstituensys of 219,000 elektors ych. And so on.
But equaly, yu kud hav a mix of uon, tw, thry etc. member konstituensys, to match the varying sIz of komunitys. And ther wud stil be PR betwyn thys konstituensys, bekaus the ratio of konstituensy elektorats to konstituensy syts is the saim.
The 1979 Boundary Komision's equalisations kaus'd an up-ror al over the kuntry. Lokal interests kontested varius exisions of wards. The Hom Afairs minister, responsibl for the direktiv, protested against himself with tw other lokal MPs, for the konsequenses to his own area.
Robert Blackburn ( 'The Electoral System in Britain' ) kronikls Labor government delay and Tory government spyd-up, of the Komision's work, to inkrys ther respektiv partys' number of syts at the next elektion.
Kalkulating party HQs no wat they are doing. The konsequent maximising of Tory syts out of al proportion to ther popular suport in the 1983 and 1987 elektions must be konsider'd as jerymandering on the grand skail, by folowing the leter of elektoral law rather than its spirit.
Les hypokritikal perhaps wer Crossman's diary konfesions of riging lokal government elektions first past the post.
Marjinal chanjes to simpl majority konstituencies ar only tu liabl to chanj the result. The Boundary Komisioners' kontentius and expensiv revisions wer stal'd by the Labor oposition taking them to the HI Kort.
The singl member system has mayd the Boundary Komision perversly epitomis al that is bluringly unstabl and fragmentorily transient to Britain's historik komunitys. After six yers work, in 1983 only 48 out of 635 konstituensys wer left unchanj'd. The Tory syts wer 19% tu many for ther sher of the vot.
Author of 'Inside The Third World,' Paul Harrison ( 'Inside The Inner City,' 1983 ) gav evidens against the singl member system as socialy disruptiv, p.417-18 ):
Our system of representation by single member constituencies also militates against reforms that could help the urban or regional poor, and, indeed, against any widespread awareness of their problems. Britain's marked social segregation has created constituencies the bulk of which are either predominantly English middle class and Tory, or predominantly working class, Welsh or Scottish, and Labour. Thus the bulk of Tory MPs, and indeed of Tory voters, have no direct experience of widespread and acute need which could awaken their compassion.
For the inner-city MP the problem of lack of widespread awareness is even more acute. Inner-city Labour MPs have trouble convincing even other Labour MPs,.. of the extent and gravity of problems in housing in employment ... law and order.'
(P. 434 ): The British political system cannot be relied on to respond constructively to this challenge. The first-past-the-post system allows governments to be elected with ... as little as one third of the electorate. Voting is largely determined by perceptions of self-interest. The groups most damaged by recent trends -- the poor, the unemployed, council tenants -- still remain geographically concentrated minorities. A sufficient proportion of voters have seen their fortunes improve despite recession to make the continuation of divisive policies possible.
Robert Newland of the Elektoral Reform Sosiety and the Liberal/SDP Alians Komision's first report on Konstitutional Reform propos'd a normal distribution of uon- to eit-member konstituensys, about an averaj of for to fIv.
This is modest kompar'd to the multi-member konstituensys that wud be nyded today for the larjer shIrs of 'the Komons' from its beginings over 700 yers ago. And most of that tIm they wer without rail-ways or motor-ways.
( The notion that houl kountys wud be unmanajabl konstituensys is lafabl by Amerikan standards of travel. )
But STV elektors for a boro or smaler shIr wudn't hav to lwk into uon-syt broken-miror konstituensys to sy ther representation. Ych STV MP wud no from surjerys and kanvasing returns wer his main suport is kluster'd ( urban Labor, sub-urban Tory or wat-ever ). So, ych MP has his main distrikts to kultivat within the multi-member konstituensy. That is the pepl to hwm the MP is literaly akountabl for his quota.
The voters ar, after al, supos'd to be chwsy about hw represents ther interests, for or fIv MPs giving them ther choises.
This konstituensy system ofers komunitys the most konvenient and akurat fit: that is the sientifik standard of mesurment.
In fysiks, a system of jeometry wud be chosen for the most konvenient and akurat mesur of spatial fenomena.
PR within konstituensys myns ych syt in a konstituensy is won on a quota or elektiv proportion of its total vot.
For exampl, we asum ( after Devolution ) about 60 Skotish MPs for the UK parliment. The Skotish elektorat is nyrly 4 milion. And ( nyrly 4m )/( about 60 ) equals perhaps 66,000 elektors per Skotish syt.
Supos sparsly populated Skotland averaj'd konstituensys of about thry members, with an elektorat of som 200,000. ( Ther'd be 4 to 6 member lots in bilt-up areas. ) With 75% turn-out, the total vot wud be 150,000. The Droop quota is ( 150,000 )/( 3 + 1) = 37,500 vots, ych of the thry MPS had to win.
PR akros konstituensys myns that konstituents kan also vot for kandidats to other konstituensys in the rejon. Som kandidats may chws to stand soly on rejonal isyus and not belong to any konstituensy. Al kandidats in the rejon ( or nation within the UK ) ar then elektabl on a rejonal quota. In Skotland, this wud be the Droop quota, taken of the total Skotish vot. On a 75% turn-out this wud be about 3 milion, divided by ( 60 + 1 ), or rufly 50,000 vots.
So, with PR akros konstituensys, thys Skotish ( UK ) MPs wud nyd to win som 12,500 mor vots, than in a ( Skotish ) averaj thry member konstituensy. But they kud apyl to Skotish voters out-sId ther konstituensy. Kandidats with personal reputations or party organisations akros Skotland ( or equivalently an English rejon ) woud hav a beter chans of elektion.
This ansers the Plant report's question about STV being proportional enuf in Wales with thry member konstituensys. Aktualy Wales has byn projekted to averaj 4 member konstituencsys, enuf for 4 major partys.
PR without konstituensys wud be esentialy the orijinal version of transferabl voting by Hare's system. ( The United Kingdom is hyr not being konsider'd as itself a konstituent part of a European parliment. ) The without-konstituensys quota wud be the nyrly 44 milion British elektors, say, on a 75% turn-out about 33 milion, divided by ( 600 + 1 ), or about 55,000 vots.
So, a Skotish kandidat with a reputation thru-out the UK mIt houp to pik up an other 5000 vots out-sId Skotland. Most lIkly he wud hav enuf Skotish suport not to nyd them, for this smal inkrys in the quota.
John Stuart Mill agry'd to stand for the konstituensy of Westminster but on national isyus rather than konstituensy isyus. He introdus'd the tw greitest demokratik kauses to Parliment, vots for women, and Hare's system. Kud Mill hav drawn on vots out-sId his konstituensy, his national reputation wud sertainly hav re-elekted him.
NIntynth sentury individualists wer perhaps les konsern'd with partys and konstituensys than twentieth sentury kolektivists. The lak of komunikation betwen thys tw sIds of demokrasy, the representation of the individual in the komunity, has sadly impair'd it.
In desIding a nw konstitutional setlment, uon has to lwk to posibl futurs, as wel as the past. This is a question of for-sIt, not greit chanjes mayd befor pepl ar redy for them.
Providing PR without constituensys kud ad to STV's powerful aray of in-bilt elektoral funktions. A komputer kount of STV kud rank MPs in asending order of chois up to the popular lyd. That mIt konfer a presidensy or lejitimis Britain's alej'd 'PrIm Ministerial government'.
This lydership kount, in a serys of rounds, kud redus the national Droop quota's quotient, uon syt at a tIm, to ( 599 + 1 ), (598 + 1 ) and so on, thus eliminating uon kandidat at a tIm. This kud rank MPs in order of popularity. Thos, low down, mIt be disqualify'd say, from a Kabinet post, or the Chair of a televis'd Selekt Komity. At any rait, until they bekaim beter nown and prov'd ther worth.
The point is that uon voting system kan evolv the fyturs of just about any demokrasy uon kers to think of. Bekaus STV is the jeneral theory of elektions, it is an amazing multi-purpos demokratik twl-kit.
Isaac Asimov said: Don't wayst yor admiration on warnings, lIk thos of H G Wells, that kaim tru. The surpris is that most pepl ignor obvius danjers. But, not being stupid, that is shurly bekaus, as Shirley Williams said, pepl think politiks is not for them. Pepl wont re-akt if they think they hav no efekt. Hens, the nyd for an edukation in elektoral empowerment.
A UK quota probably wudn't be an option til the rejons and nations within the UK ych had adopted ther akros-konstituensy quota. This itself mIt be don in stajes. For instans, Glasgow mIt rather be uon ten-member konstituensy than tw fIv-member konstituensys, north and south of the Clyde. Sparsly populated Skotland wud be most lIkly to adopt a Skotish quota. But that wud be for the Skotish pepl to desId, after the introduktion of PR ( within konstituensys ).
Over-al STV/PR refuts the stok kritisism that STV kan not be mayd proportional enuf in the kontext of a konstituensy system.
Of the 4 relations ych, of transferabl voting to partys, and to konstituensys, we kan tak or lyv STV akros konstituensys and without konstituensys. This givs 8, or 6, posibl ways to relat partys and konstituensys to other voting systems.
Party list systems relat to thys 8 posibilitys in only 2 ways, naimly PR betwyn partys and PR without konstituensys. In partikular, the later way is tru of national lists. A rejonal list kud be said to give PR betwyn konstituensys for Euro-elektions. But stil only 2 of the 8 lojikal posibilitys ar kater'd for.
Party lists impos dogmatik partisanship on the pepl. They also impos a konstituensy-skeptikal vot, bekaus lists presum no patern of voting for lokal konstituensy kandidats.
Aditional Member systems kombin thys deficiensys of party lists with the limitations of the singl member system. Al voting systems with any egalitarian pretensions to demokrasy ar to some extent proportional systems.
The singl member system, with equal elektorats, givs PR betwyn konstituensys. But this is only uon out of eit lojikal posibilitys for PR. And ych haf of the kombin'd system only haf givs its uon or tw out of eit kinds of PR, proper.
No rival systems kom remotly klos to the six- or potentialy eitfold way of STV/PR or 'the super-vot', as Joe Rogaley kal'd it.
The Droop quota brodens our notion of a majority. A majority is not simply uon member's majority of, say, 50 vots out of 100. ( If tw kandidats rych'd the 50 vots quota, that wud be a tI-brek. ) Yusing the Droop quota kan mak tw members' majoritys of 50 vots ych out of 150. Thry quotas, of 50 vots ych out of 200, elekt thry members' majoritys.
The singl member majority kount is jeneralis'd by the Droop quota into a multi-member majority kount.
The vot jeneralises in a similar way from a uon-preferens spot vot to a many-preferens vot, in order of chois.
First past the post or the simpl majority system and STV ar the limited and jeneral 'relativ majority' systems. First past the post elekts uon kandidat on a majority relativ only to the runer-up. Therfor, most voters may go unrepresented. STV elekts as many kandidats as konstituensy syts, ych with the saim majority, relativ to al the runers-up put together. Then, the over-welming majority is represented.
A majority myns 'greiter than' and, therfor, must be relativ to wat it is greiter than. Chois is also relativ, in that we mor or les favor som kandidats in relation to others. Indyd, a skail of preferens is from greiter to leser chois. So, magnitud of chois is translated, from the vot as preferenses, into the kount as majoritys. The kount of the komunity is the mesur of greitnes that koresponds to the vot of individuals.
A model from fysiks shows how the vot and kount korespond. Einstein favor'd Relativity as a 'prinsipl theory', wich maks lojikal deduktions from a firm empirikal bais, that motion is relativ to a ko-ordinat system.
Similarly, chois is relativ to a ko-ordinat system of the vot to the kount. An empirikal order of preferens 1, 2, 3, etc koresponds to a rational order of 1, 2, 3, etc member majoritys.
This is the viw of siens as empirikal rationalism.
Harré karakteris'd model-bilding by its gradual adaptation to reality. In this kais, the reality is the relativity of chois in jeneral, beyond a basik alternativ to a houl ranj of options. STV has the koherens of a gud theory of chois.
The theory of relativ chois myns in praktis that transferabl voting experimentaly kontrols the relativ influens of kandidats on ych others elektion. So, the relativly popular kandidats do not tak tu many vots from thos hw wud be next prefer'd for elektion. And relativly les popular kandidats' voters ar not left unrepresented by ther next preferenses.
STV mIt bekom itself a model for experimental mesurment, bekaus its ordinal and ratio skails akt as kontrols of its klasifying and interval skails, respektivly. Ordinal skail preferens voting kontrols wasted voting on fail'd kandidats. Other-wIs, it is to no efekt for som that every-uon is klasify'd as having a vot. The quota kount's ratio skail kontrols the interval, of redundant vots, beyond the vots that just tak suksesful kandidats first past the post.
In demokratik, rather than sientifik, terms, the singl transferabl vot is both a preferential and proportional sufraj extension.
This jeneral theory of relativ chois explains STV as an elektoral system. It also explains wI STV aplIs to al elektions. And wI other voting systems, being les jeneral in ther vot or ther kount, kan not be yus'd for al elektoral purposes.
For exampl, the Irish hav yus'd STV at al levels of government, lokal, rejonal, national and European.
And the Northern Ireland Euro-elektions aproch a krucial test, in wich al, but the uon method yus'd, wud probably fail.
A party list system, such as the Seventys Lib-Lab pakt's Rejonal List, wud hav split the Nationalist vot in Ulster, bekaus the SDLP and Sinn Fein wud not hav submited a joint party list.
Perhaps, John Hume wud hav bekom MEP, any-way, but only bekaus of his exeptional standing as a sivil rIts veteran, and bekaus he was alow'd to be an MEP as wel as an MP. Never the les, Nationalist voters' kros-party preferenses ensur'd a quota for uon of ther kandidats.
In the 1996 Pys forum elektions aditional to 18 konstituensys of 90 members, 2 pepl wer selekted from ych of the top 10 partys. Jujing by this hIly kontriv'd aranjment, Ulster/Northern Ireland kud do with a provincial STV quota, as explain'd ( abov ) for Skotland.
( Nout: Subsequent elektions remedy'd this aberation with a strait-forward system of STV in six-member konstituensys. )
Traditionalists, lIk Maude and Szemerey, say a propos'd elektoral reform has to be in every way beter than the simpl majority system. STV kud hardly be other-wIs, bekaus it is a konsistent jeneralisation, by vot and kount, from that most limited system of chois. STV kan do every thing it kan do, and an imens dyl mor, as shown of STV's explanatory power, for al kinds of elektoral requirments.
Transferabl voting puts a prinsipl theory of relativ chois to the elektoral test as a sientifik law. Sientifik laws ar konditional staitments and the konditional prinsipl STV kan be said to formulat, is 'unanimity only in liberty'. Akros and within party divisions, the degry and kind of national unity, that transferabl voting maks posibl, is a kondition of individual liberty. Or, proportional kounting is a kondition of preferens voting.
We kan kal this 'the Hare-Andrae law' of sientifik elektions ( after the Danish Liberal Carl Andrae and English barister Thomas Hare, hw independently diskover'd it ). 'Proportional Representation' is a kondition of 'Personal Representation', as Mill rekognis'd wen he gav both naims to Hare's system.
Hyr is an other perspektiv on wI party list systems ar unsientifik. A sientifik law is a konditional staitment but the sudo-law of proportional partisanship is not konditional upon an order of individual chois, so it kan only expres divisions, not unity in diversity.
Konditional staitments ar part of the deduktiv model of siens, by wich explanations kan be dedus'd, in this kais, of demokrasy. The French republikan slogan ilustrats a deduktiv explanation of demokrasy. A law of fraternity or universal brotherhud is given by the individual human kondition of liberty, thru representativ equality. Thus equality is konklusivly explain'd by its purpos of serving fraternity in liberty.
Sientifik elektions exemplify the demokratik theory in praktis. The deduktiv explanation of elektions is that the universality of the proportional kount of a komunity is konditional upon individual liberty of preferens voting, implIing an egalitarian transfer of the vot in the kount. Hens sosiety in its prefer'd grupings is proportionaly represented.
A party-privilej'd proportional kount is unsientifik bekaus it destroys this universal prinsipl of tru proportional representation, as distinkt from proportional partisanship.
For exampl, the British Jeneral Medikal Kounsil yusing STV, gav PR to its social and funktional grups. Minoritys, such as imigrants, women and specialists wer proportionaly represented.
A party list-system kud not hav don this. Having to mak 'partys' of al konsyvabl grupings wud hav byn an arbitrary bisnes and beg'd the question of the elektion, in efekt, riging it. ( Party list systems ar party-rig'd elektions. )
Helth servis voters kudn't order ther choises with an X-vot, only vot for a list representing uon atribut, say ther speciality. Wer-as, thry X-vots for thry atributs, such as imigrant woman specialist, wud hav kounted against ych other.
With a transferabl vot, the most prefer'd individuals ar elekted. Taking the trubl to onor individual liberty dignifys the voters with the power to prefer the kandidats in order of ther having most of the atributs yu wish them to hav.
Transferabl voting is integrativ. Party lists ar dis-integrativ, bekaus, to ensur the singl most important thing to yu is represented, yu hav to form a brek-away list to party-proportionaly kount.
Proportionaly partisan X-voting is kondusiv to a miselanus kolektion of mono-mania's demanding ther ko-alition terms to tolerat a government.
John Stuart Mill rylIs'd that proportional representation is a kontinuation of demokrasy in extending the sufraj from majoritys to minoritys. Majority rul that stop'd short of demokrasy proper, he kal'd 'maiorokrasy'. Yet, the short-komings of 'elektiv diktatorship' by simpl majoritys ar often rongly held to be a failur of demokrasy.
( Even akademiks hav not lern'd from Mill. The Plant report klaims Arrow's theorem deduses the limitations of demokrasy. But it is bais'd on a singl member majority system, lIk the Alternativ Vot, wich is a limited konseption of demokrasy.)
The fragmentation of parts of the world into waring faktions is not help'd by the falasy that ber majority rul is 'demokrasy' and as such the limit to any obligations that a majority has to minoritys.
A klyr konsequens is that minoritys syk to eskaip majority diktatorships by seting up ther own separat staits, wer they kan fulfil the drym of being ther own majority diktatorships, from wich som other ethnik minority may syk eskaip, if not mersilesly driven out of ther homs as refujys or viktims of jenosId.
Soverein staithud konfers the arbitrary status of absolut majority on som ethnik grup, al of wich ar ryly minoritys relativ to humanity as a houl. 'The minoritys problem' is ultimatly a problem for us al.
Party lists, wether or not kombin'd with majority systems, giv minority partys a sher of syts. But they impos ther own kind of absolutism of party divisions, wen pepl hav to vot for 'a party'. The elektoral rekognition of relativ chois, thru transferabl voting, maks unity in liberty a praktikal posibility, for thos hw desir it.
Plainly, Mill's matur konseption of demokrasy has much to tych the world for pysful ko-existens.
Northern Ireland is a familiar exampl. Michael Collins was given Churchill's asurans on PR for Northern Ireland. The Irish Fry Stait rowt the singl transferabl vot into ther Konstitution. Tw referendums fail'd to remov it. So, the Irish wel understand and apreciat ther voting system.
This is konfirm'd by Elektoral Reform Sosiety observers.
Befor 1929, transferabl voting had almost witl'd away the Unionists' over-al majority. This wudn't hav hapen'd but for the Republikan border areas inkluded in Ulster. The simpl majority system ensur'd a uon-party stait that didn't hav to kompromis. So, the pysful sivil rIts marches, of Katholiks in the sixtys, found loyalists unredy to tolerat them.
British governments, from William Whitelaw onward, apreciated the problem and trI'd to bring in power-shering, or that unity in diversity the provins had lwk'd to be begining to mov towards.
A fatal obstakl, of kors, was that no patient ever twk the medisin his own fysician dreded and despis'd. The point is that until Mill's matur konseption of demokrasy is jeneraly rekognis'd and bekoms the aksepted konvention, ther wil always be thos nominal demokrats hoping to get al ther own way from maiorokrasy.
Naturaly, pepl kan not kom together against ther wil. But giv the pepl the system that lets them unIt as wel as divid. As uon world gradualy bekoms mor of a reality, it is obvius that a world government wud never work without power-shering, as yu kud never lyv-out any of the greit kontinental konstituensys or kultural bloks for even uon term of ofis.
Richard Lung.