( Kapital-i, in 'I, myself', now spels Il as in isle or aisle.
Leter y spels ryd for reed or read and partys for parties.
Leter w spels swn for soon. )
Links to sektions:
(1) Basiks Of Voting Method AplI'd To The 1998 Jenkins Komision's Terms Of Referens.
(2) Konsequenses Of The Jenkins Komision's Reking Reform Of The Lojik Of Chois:
(3) The Jenkins Komision's Kais Against The Singl Transferabl Vot:
A publik debait about voting method requirs som nolej of its basiks. Singl chois X-vots elekt a singl member majority. This is Britain's kurent system, the most limited posibl chois. A preferens vot is order'd chois ( lst, 2nd, 3rd, etc. ) of many members' majoritys: from uon member on over haf the vots, to tw members on relativ majoritys of over uon-third the vots ych ( for a proportional representation of tw-thirds the vots ); to thry members on over uon quarter the vots ych ( for a PR of thry-quarters the vots ) and so on.
This transferabl voting system is a jeneralisation of chois, konsistently with regard to both the vot and the kount. A singl member X-vot for a singl member majority is jeneralis'd or rationalis'd to a multi-member preferens vot for a multi-member majority. This maks STV the jeneral system of chois. Failur to folow this jeneral purpos system akounts for the UK's elektoral anarky by 1998.
Only elektoral prinsipl kan enhans the independent komision's terms of referens ( number'd below 1 to 4 ) with respekt to ych other. As the system of jeneral chois, STV (1) 'extends voter chois' and is also the myns to mor (2) 'stabl government'. Bekaus, STV works lIk a primary to setl internal party disputs, by prefering kandidats within a party, and also as a ko-alition desider ( not only within but ) akros partys, in extending preferenses to diferent partys' kandidats.
Frank Baigel ( from Manchester, leter to The Independent, 3 Nov. 1998 ) said much the saim about STV. He went on: Voters wud then be determining the trend they wish to folow. Is this tu much for British politicians to kontemplat?
STV's multi-member konstituensys averajing for or fIv MPs ( for for-fifths or fIv-sixths PR ) wud be (3) 'brodly proportional'. Yet most wud be smaler in area than the Komons historik shIrs.
Andrew Mackay ( from London, leter to The Independent, 31 Oct. 1998 said: The 'historik' link betwen the MP and the konstituents exists only in the minds of MPs elekted under the kurent system.
As Winston Churchill said best of (4) 'MPs links to konstituensys': I wud rather be uon-fifth of the Members for the houl of Leeds than uon Member for a fifth of Leeds.
A fw self-kontain'd sparsly populated UK areas ( notably Orkney and Shetlands and the Western Isles ) probably wud want ther own singl member konstituensys and parts of the Highlands perhaps only dubl member konstituensys. ( Tho, an Irish referendum, that kept STV, voted against singl members even in ther lyst inhabited areas. )
Ther was never any nyd for the Voting Komision to jugl its 4 terms of referens against ych other. They komplement ych other as gId-lIns for demokratik voting. The leter from Vernon Bogdanor ( sy vol. II of the Komision report, 'Key Evidence'. The Stationary Office. ) is perhaps the best sumary kais, but by no myns the only important kais, that the terms of referens ar best fulfil'd by STV.
To get the terms of referens at ods, the Komision invented a system that got the basiks of voting method at ods.
LIk al Aditional Member Systems ( AMS ), the Voting Komision's reform is a kais of tw rongs don't mak a rIt. The first part of ther mix'd system, the Alternativ Vot ( AV ) fails, in yusing a many-member ( preferens ) vot for only uon-member majority konstituensys. Konversly, the sekond part fails by yusing a uon-member vot ( with an X ) for a many-member ( proportional ) kount.
The Alternativ Vot ( indyd singl member systems ) Wayst First Preferenses.
AV ensurs most first preferenses wil not kount, as voters monopolis'd by singl members kan not be proportionaly or equaly represented. Wer-as, the singl transferabl vot ensurs most first preferenses do kount. Kandidats elekted, with mor vots than the quota or requir'd proportion, hav that surplus vot preferentialy transfer'd. This wil help elekt the first preferenses of other voters in a multi-member konstituensy.
Thys surplus vots, from the most popular kandidats, helping to elekt other voters' first preferenses may be kal'd 'the best vots for the best kandidats.' This is in lojikal kontrast to Churchill's deskription of AV as 'the worst vots for the worst kandidats.' Bekaus, in kontrast to STV, the result depends on the re-distribution of vots for kandidats with lyst first preferenses.
In a singl member konstituensy, ther kan be only uon winer. Ther may be litl mor than chans in wich kandidats hav the sekond or third most first preferenses.
As Lord Alexander's exampl, in his nout to the Jenkins report, shows: if a Liberal koms third, his re-distributed vots' sekond preferenses kud help elekt a Konservativ. If Labor kaim third, thos voters' sekond preferenses kud help elekt the Liberal.
Alexander's wanting first past the post is a kounsel of despair. X-voting, split betwen several kandidats for uon syt, minimises the number of first preferenses elekted. Indyd, unlIk AV, yu don't even no X-vots ar first preferenses or taktikal votings' leser preferenses.
The majority atitud of the Komision was:
There is nothing morally wrong about either informal tactical voting or the formalisation of alternative choices under AV. In many situations of life a decision has to be made in favour of a second or third best choice and there is no inherent reason why what has often to be applied to jobs, houses, even husbands and wives should be regarded as illegitimate when it comes to voting.
( The Guardian, Oct. 30 1998, p.VII, sektion: Tactikal Voting. Referenses to the Jenkins report ar from the Guardian edition of vol.I unles otherwis stated.)
Uon jurnalist regarded Jenkins' notorius klaim as hardly flatering to his wIf. Analojys apart, it is sertainly 'moraly rong' to mak many pepl do with AV's chansy results from sekond or third or leser preferenses, wen STV kud elekt most first preferenses.
The Top-Up Vot Kounts For Party Oligarky.
Insted of rekomending STV, the Komision try'd to lumber Britain with a tw-in-uon voting system, for jeneral elektions, to try to partly korekt the dis-proportionat AV. An X-vot is given for a chois of party lists, or mini-lists, in this kais. The 'party vots' ar kounted for the partys' proportional sher of syts. Party list systems giv the exklusiv rIt, to any proportional representation, to partys. PR bekoms a eufemism for proportional partisanship. It is lIk saying: Al voters ar equal but party stalwarts ar mor equal than others.
Wer-as, STV givs al grups and personal atributs in sosiety equal rIts to representation for a truly 'fair' and stabl konstitution setlment.
Privilej enshrin'd in a party-proportional kount is a sors of endles human rIts konflikt, wykening sosiety, also fais'd with serius environmental problems of its own making.
'Flexibility', A PolIt Term For Manipulation
Not only dos the Voting Komision's system nydlesly set the partys against the pepl, it also sets the partys against ych other, by failing to setl the ruls of the elektoral gaim.
The Jenkins report is plys'd to kal the yus of diferent proportions of aditional members 'flexibility' ( p.V, Advantajes of a mix'd system, first tw and last paragrafs ) to 'strike such a balance as best to reconcile the four terms of reference'.
The Komision dosn't explain wI ych elekted institution, yusing or in prospekt of yusing AMS, has to strIk a diferent balans.
The 'admirabl' Plant report wud say that 'exekutiv' bodys nyd mor of majority government to push thru desisions. 'Lejislativ' bodys kan be mor proportional to reflekt the komposition of ther konstituents.
The dogmatik partisan belyvs that efektiv government is diktatorial, al-be-it a diktatorship of the larjest faktion. Alowing mor partys into a body kauses a greiter konflikt of wils that maks les abl to akt.
But this nyd only be tru in so far as such a lejislatur is a konklav of klos'd minds. Only then kan it be tryted as a talking shop to advis but not hav much power. That hapens wen proportional representation is tasitly redus'd to the proportional partisanship of party list systems, wich rijidly divid or imprison MPs on party lIns. In truth, we and our representativs ar individuals with polisys mor or les in komon akros the national spektrum of opinion.
The diferent exekutiv-lejislativ balans of diferent elekted institutions is a bogus argument of dogmatik partisans but it dos serv ther out-lwk of dominat or be dominated, to hav an alibi of 'flexibility' for manipulating the proportion of aditional members, as wil best suit a given party's or ko-alition's prospekts of power.
The Komision's vasilation betwen 15% and 20% of parlimentary syts to lend proportion betwen the partys, may not sym lIk much, but it is krucial enuf to kaus quIt a politikal skrum. 5% can myn the diferens betwen 33 smal-tIm politicians geting jobs and 33 inkumbents being turf'd out. A dent of 66 MPs in a parlimentary majority is lIkly to be of mor than akademik interest to party lyders, especialy on top of a 15% erosion of first past the post land-slId viktorys.
In a sound-bIt from uon Komision member, David Lipsey intimated that uon thing they didn't want was perpetual ko-alition. ( Never mind wat the publik wants. ) The voters wer to be taken in hand by the nany stait.
The Jenkins report talks of reform 'without imposing a ko-alition habit on the kuntry'. The British pepl ar to be sav'd from themselvs -- but not sav'd from being impos'd on by the Komision's devises. The publik's bad habit of rerly giving uon party a majority of vots wud be byten enuf by ther system to ensur uon party wil often enuf get a majority of syts, any-way.
And the konstitution stil wud fais destabilising power politiks betwyn the partys to chanj the elektoral ruls to ther advantaj. The larjer partys want les party proportion ( wich was wI the 1966 Grand Alians was form'd in West Germany ); the smaler partys want mor.
The Jenkins report admits the German aditional member system entrench'd a smal third party in government ( p.VI, Proportionality and stabl government ). Such a smal minority kan serv as a king-maker in its chois of ko-alition partner. Insted of avoiding the German system of smal minority king-maker, the komision kompounds it with the British system of larjest minority rul.
The Jenkins report proposes not so much a system as a wavering betwyn larjer or smaler minority partys' exes power.
Kros-Purposes Top-Up Vot For A Party Or Ko-alition Partner
Aditional member systems, lIk 'Alternativ Vot top-up', ar tu at kros-purposes for voters to klyrly prefer a given ko-alition. Party suporters kan't giv ther party vot to an other party, if ther own party mIt nyd it to get aditional members. Thus the top-up vot, as a ko-alition vot, is the privilej'd chois of thos voters hws party alredy has an unfairly disproportionat sher of safe singl member syts in the rejon.
This privilej is aksentuated, the les singl member konstituensys ther ar. For, they ar then mor lIkly to fal to the larjest party. So, the party disproportions inkrys, even as singl members mak way for mor aditional or top-up members to 'korekt' them.
In short, AMS is unstabl.
Thus ko-alition chois with AMS is a mor or les smal minority privilej, not the demokratik chois of ko-alition, wich is supos'd to be the point of the exersis ( and wich STV dos giv ).
'Ko-alition' Top-Up Vot As Taktikal Vot Against Lyst LIk'd Party's Proportional Entitlment.
To top.Having vaunted this privilej of split-party voting, the komision is then at pains to play down how it mIt be abus'd. ( p.VII, Taktikal voting ). For exampl, Labor party strong-holds, with no houp of aditional members, kud vot taktikly with ther top-up X-vot, for a Liberal Demokrat to denI Konservativs party-proportional entitlment to an extra syt in the area. Konversly, Konservativ strong-holds kud vot for a Liberal to deny Labor a top-up syt.
Minority Party Top-Up Vot As A Wasted Vot
Liberal Demokrat voters themselvs wudn't be abl to elekt ther man in 30 of the 78 main-land rejons designated by the Jenkins report. ( Sors: John Curtice, Deputy direktor of the ESRC Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends, The Independent, 30 Oct. 1998. )
For thos Lib Dems, the top-up vot wud be a wasted vot. To hav an efekt on the result, thos wud-be Lib Dems wud hav to konsider voting Konservativ or Labor.
Top-Up Vots For Rival Partys' Worst List Kandidats ( After Sabotaj Of Amerikan Open Primarys ).
Wer ther wer tw top-up Liberal kandidats or mor ( and the report rekomends an extra to kover a parlimentary vakansy ) a strong party in the rejon, Labor or Konservativ voters, kud deliberatly chws the worst Liberal. So, the main rivals kud rejonaly do ych other down as partys, wIl doing down the personel of the third party.
Party animosity is not to be under-estimated. To damaj ther oponents, party rivals did ther worst in Amerikan primarys, til they had to be klos'd to the jeneral publik. ( STV over-koms this problem.)
The Komision regarded open lists as esential to fulfil the requirment of extending voter chois. ( Rol of top-up members p.VI, col. 8, 6th para. from end of sektion.) But the saim motivs that fors'd shut Amerikan primarys, wil work to efektivly klos the top-up lists.
This charad, this 'AV top-up' mix-up is taktikal voting's reduktion to the absurd.
'Frydom' -- In A Prison Rejym
To top..Party list systems denI al voters the rIt to chws individual kandidats, without that chois being yusabl, regardles of uon's wishes, to elekt an other kandidat, myrly bekaus in the saim party. Far from extending voter chois, this hijacks it for the partys.
Mor-over, this prevents individual preferens expresing a mesur of kros-party unity. List systems ar a proportional kount only of party divisions. This party-privilej'd kount exkluds al other social grups or atributs from equal trytment.
For thys rysons -- denial of individual chois, denial of social equality, and denial of national unity -- no party list system shud be yus'd in a demokrasy.
Perhaps to kounter-akt this standard kritisism, the sektion on the rol of top-up members, staits that it ofers 'frydom' -- thry tIms in the last fIv paragrafs, so we may be duly impres'd.
This 'frydom' is explain'd in terms of 'two rights; first to bolt the party ticket completely with his or her second vote' for ( forth mention of frydom ) 'freeing the voter from the prison of having to suffer an unwanted candidate for the constituency in order to get a desired government.'
'Second...that the voter should be able to discriminate between the candidates put forward for the list by the party for which he or she wishes to cast the second vote.' The komision wud hav us belyv frydom to be parol and probation from a prison rejym:
The sekond vot for a ko-alition partner puts voters on parol not to taktikly out-wei ther most dislIk'd party's proportional entitlment to a top-up MP. But a promis of gud voting behavior kan not be garanty'd by a badly behaiv'd system that maks 'ofenders' of the
voters.
The komision givs the so-kal'd rIt to chws betwyn kandidats on a party mini-list, so party voters don't hav to put up with an MP they don't aprov of. But this probation system is fony, bekaus list systems kan not prov the vot yu giv to a party kandidat wil not go to elekt an other in the saim party.
In fakt, the vot for a party ( 'to bolt the party tiket' ) asums yor individual chois may be disregarded, imprisoning the voters in party sels. The rIt to individual frydom dos not denI partisan voting. But kounting every-uon a party voter denIs individual frydom.
Expediens Over Prinsipl
To top.Ian Campbell ( of Dyfed, in a 31 Oct. 1998 leter to The Independent ) said:
If this report is adopted we face a future of more of the same, but made more confused and chaotic by compromise and cowardice. Lord Jenkins is far too clever and not at all wise.
An other korespondent said, previusly:
It will be particularly interesting to watch the ingenuities of the politicians in the new Parliament in producing schemes that will look like electoral reform and yet leave the profession still active for mischief. They will fight desperately against large constituencies with numerous members. The one member or two-member constituency is absolutely necessary to their party system. In such constituencies even proportional representation can be reduced to a farce. And also they will offer cheap but attractive substitutes like the second ballot and the alternative vote. And they will fake extraordinary arrangements by which the voter will vote not for an individual but for a ticket or bunch, and they will call these fakes this or that improved variety of 'proportional representation'. All the political parties in Britain are at present trying to work out the probable effects of this or that fake or cheap substitute for electoral honesty, upon the party prospects. In this matter the Labour Party is as bad as any other party - or worse. The discussion of electoral legislation in ... Parliament throughout the next session, though it may make the angels weep, is certain to afford much entertainment to every mundane observer of human disingenuousness.
Is that quot a profesy in the leters of The Independent about the Jenkins report?
No, The Westminster Gazette, in 1923, from H G Wells ( re-printed in 'A Year Of Prophesying' ).
The komision's reform is 'a dog's brek-fast'. The report open'd on its job: to rekomend the best alternativ 'system or kombination of systems'. But, at the report's launch, the chairman said, he mayd no bouns about it, that the komision was influens'd by wat system they thot kud be pas'd. That isn't the rol of an independent komision, wich was to serv truth not power.
WIl the report pretends to serch for the best reform, it was ryly working under an enfybling sekret ajenda of pre-konsyv'd notions about wat was akseptabl to the powers that be. This was sanktion'd neither by the government's terms nor by publik opinion.
By not being open or onest in ther report about wat systems the komision thot parliment ( or pepl ) wud or wud not aksept, the report has efektivly konspir'd against prinsipl for expediens.
Hens, ther arguments -- fybl in the extrym -- against the orijinal system of proportional representation, the singl transferabl vot. ( Thys ar diskus'd in part 2. )
Politician and historian Roy Jenkins' 30,000 word report has an introduktion uon jurnalist deskrib'd as 'delItful' but 'irelevant'. Not til over haf way thru, do we kom to the tw desisiv sektions that rejekt STV. As the dokument says ( in the suksyding sektion on the kais for a mix'd system ) 'If we do not go in an STV direction the alternative must be a variant of the Additional Member System.'
So, let us examin the komision's arguments to eliminat STV:
Konstituensys 'too big' for representation in Britain -- but not Amerika!
The Jenkins report repyts the Plant report that British STV multi-member konstituensys wud be tu big at for or fIv tIms the sIz of Irish STV konstituensys. ( Australia is leiter dismis'd for komparison as being 'barely a quarter' of Britain's population. ) But STV, in Britain, wud averaj for or fIv member konstituensys that wer no biger than Amerikan, or Indian, singl member konstituensys. Therfor, the Plant and Jenkins reports implI representativ democracy imposibl in kuntrys biger than Britain.
This formost argument against STV is klyrly irational prejudis. Indyd, if this non-sens wer taken seriusly, demokrasy wud be rul'd out on any konsiderabl skail. Therfor, it is the Plant and Jenkins reports wich must be rejekted, insted.
The report's level of argument dos not improv.
STV Ballot Paper 'Too Long' For Britain -- But Not Ireland!
To top.The komision gos on that STV konstituensys of 350,000 elektors wud hav a very long balot paper and a degry of chois 'that might be deemed oppressive rather than liberating.'
In fakt, the mor choises voters enter, the marjinaly mor proportional the result -- frydom and equality ryly do go together. Not thinking so, the komision's own system is rather short on both.
The politikal prwds on the komision revers STV's elektoral lisens with a venjens. Ther system's sekond vot ( with an X ) givs uon chois for uon ( or les often tw ) party seats over a typikal eit ( up to twelv ) member konstituensy area.
Wer-as ther kombin'd system's first part konfins a preferens vot to singl member konstituensys, wer its order'd chois for many members kan not tak efekt.
Thys monopolys ar opresiv rather than liberating. Ther ar British saif syts held by uon party longer than the komunists monopolis'd ther Soviet empIr. It's tIm this elektoral wyl was for turning.
Mor-over, preferens voters do not hav to number-order al the kandidats, only as many as ar prefer'd. It is for the voters to desId -- not the Jenkins komision to presyum -- how many kandidats deserv a ranking.
The report ads: 'many are interested only in voting for parties, and would not appreciate being forced into choosing between candidates of the same party about each of whom they know little.' -- Roy Jenkins and Michael Foot, for instans.
It misrepresents STV that alej'd ny-jerk partisans hav to chws, wer ther is such a chois. They nyd only prefer kandidats with ther party label, as fw or as many as they lIk.
We don't hav to aksept the kontradiktion in terms that pepl hav to be 'fors'd' into frydom of chois, nor dos STV do so.
Redusing Spoilt Papers
The report vaigly says the Irish 'have a somewhat but not vastly higher proportion of spoilt papers than in Britain.'
From this it may be gather'd that the figurs ar not hI.
But, in 1998, the Irish government desided to yus fotos for kandidats, to help voters with literasy problems.
Leo Amery introdus'd STV to Malta, in 1923, with 90% iliterasy.
The 1998 Human Development report estimated mor than 20% of British pepl funktionaly iliterat. But the Irish hav to lern perhaps the tw most irationaly ( spych- ) spelt languajes in the world: English and Gaelic. ( A rational English alfabet for short-hand purposes is also a demokratik kaus.
Inkrysing PR And Turn-out
The report self-karikaturs its bias in rIting of 'the Irish tradition of almost excessively high voting.' And syzes on rysent Irish turn-out being slItly lower than Britain's.
( After-nout 2002: In 2001, the UK jeneral elektion turn-out fel from 71% to 59%. )
Uon faktor worth noting is that over the dekaids, the number of members per konstituensy has byn witled down, by the larjest party to get mor than its fair sher of syts. This wud also tend to shut out voters not in the politikal main-strym. A nw party may do wel for a wIl. But that dosn't adres the problem of giving marjinal interests a chans of representation, in only thry or for syts konstituensys. Going bak to mor proportional representation, with mor syts per konstituensy mIt enkuraj the extra vots that wud mak up very hI turn-outs.
Wat They Don't Tel Yu About 'Komplikated' Kounts
To top.The Jenkins report maks stok komplaint, never justify'd, that the STV kount is 'excessively complicated'. Not a shred of evidens, only inuendo, folows from the tw paragrafs begining 'The counting is incontestably opaque ... '
The singl transferabl vot is kounted by the 'Droop quota', wich simply extends singl majoritys of over haf the vots, to multi-majoritys: tw members wining over uon-third the vots ych; thry members wining over uon-quarter the vots ych, and so on.
Kompar that explanation with any of the inumerabl 'divisor' kounts yus'd in party list systems -- or wors stil, aditional list systems -- with ther jenius for division. ( Even the Droop quota bekoms 'opaque' wen yus'd for party list kounting. )
Kompar the Droop quota kount, abov, as yus'd for transferabl voting, with, for instans, the Jenkins report's truly 'opaque' explanation of ther party-proportional kount. ( The Guardian pul-out: Advantajes of a mix'd system. p.V, col.8)
Of kors, wat kritiks of STV's komplexity ar geting at is that the proportional kount is komplikated by the ( 'Senatorial' ) ruls of transferabl voting to elekt kandidats in the popular order. It is so much simpler to lyv a fw party boses to order the kandidats' elektion, than let forty-od milion voters do it for them.
But as swn as yu try to mak list systems les oligarkik, by alowing the voters an element of individual chois, or mov from klos'd lists to open lists, they produs anomalus results, from ther lak of prinsipl ( naimly, lak of fryly transferabl voting ).
Such ar the dubl standards in kounting that unfairly favor oligarky to demokrasy.
A Diferent System Only Bekoms A Disadvantaj Wen It's STV
Next, the report klaims 'STV suffers from the accidental disadvantage that it is a different system' exept in Northern Ireland, wer yus'd for thry levels of government -- wich is mor than the komision's 'AV top-up' wil ever be yus'd for. Even the inventors of this hybrid system wud hav to admit it is of limited yus.
The Jenkins komision must subskrib to the Plant komity's belyf in diferent systems for diferent institutions.
Then wI shud it be a disadvantaj at al, in the Plant-Jenkins way of thinking, that STV is a diferent system? Kud this be unfair diskrimination?
The espousers of anarky in elektoral method mak themselvs ridikulus by kondeming the transferabl voting prinsipl as 'too big a leap from that to which we have become used, and it would be a leap in a confusingly different direction from the other electoral changes...' ( Konklusion on STV, p.V, col.7 )
( Amusingly, a Guardian kaption rIter gav the gaim away, by re-rIting the Jenkins report as saying: 'Why STV is too big a leap forward.' My italiks. )
With wat amounts to self-kondemnation for burdening Britain with a nw system, the report gos on:
There is nonetheless an obvious disadvantage to burdening large parts of the voting public with getting used to several new systems within a short time-scale. It is also an odd quirk of STV that it has never been tried in a country which has not within this century been subject to British rule.
Al we nyded was the Jenkins komision to put rIt in nIn months wat it twk nyrly uon and a haf senturys of the English-spyking traditions of demokratik voting reform to evolv. QuIt a put-down for STV's long-term and wId-spred yus. In komparison, how kan uon dismis strongly enuf the novis AV top-up system?
Now we no wat elektoral reformers from John Stuart Mill to Enid Lakeman ar: 'an odd quirk'.
So wer the lIks of John Milton and Daniel Defoe ( to naim literary figurs ) 'odd quirks' from fashonabl absolut monarkys.
The Fashon In Party Absolutism.
To top.The over-welming fyling of reform and anti-reform witneses alIk was against mor power to party macyns. ( About the only nw evidens to kom out of the abstrakt first of eit pajes to the Guardian edition of the report. ) The report's air of balans'd jujment is belI'd by the non-sequitur: 'it is important not to be carried too far by a fashionable current and to pretend representative democracy can function without parties.'
But the komision has folow'd the fashon of an X-vot absolutly for a party. This may re-infors tribal skisms of klas, rais, relijon or ethnik grup, etc, to wich out-siders ar les than human abstraktions, hws individual karakter kounts for nothing.
STV Mor Popular With Irish Voters Than Politicians
STV's greiter popularity with Irish voters than politicians is dam'd with faint prais, that inflats the Jenkins report's list of 'kounter-balansing disadvantajes'. Bekaus, 'it is at least possible that the politicians may be better judges of what conduces to effective government.'
It is also sertainly tru that uon has the rIt to rejekt jujment afekted by a konflikt of interest. From a prIm konsern with ther karyrs, 'politician' has bekom a word of abyus.
Demokrats don't dispyut that the pepl on top may som-tIms no beter, wich is the irelevant point the report is making. The question is wether demokrasy is the best prinsipl, properly aplI'd in the popular system, that ryly is popular with the pepl hw yus it.
STV's popularity rather kansels out the kritisism that it is tu
komplikated.
Next, kom tw mor self-kanseling arguments, against STV
Self-Kontradiktory Kritisism Of STV Not As Tu Remot But Tu Parokial
To top.The Jenkins report repyts an other Plant report komplaint. It turns out that STV kreats so much kompetition betwyn MPs within, as wel as betwyn, partys that this system 'so far from producing remote representatives, produces excessively parochial ones.'
The Plant and Jenkins reports try to hav it both ways. Jenkins qualifys 'The point, for what it is worth,' bekaus the self-kontradiktion obviusly refuts the other main komplaint that STV's multi-member konstituensys ar tu big for MPs to be 'link'd' to ther konstituensys ( as if they wer a sort of bal and chain that must not be tu hevy for MPs to drag around.)
Irish voters with a gryvans aparently hav the deplorabl trait of trying out al ther MPs in turn, 'thereby wasting a good deal of the time of ministers, civil servants, TDs, and indeed of the constituents themselves.'
On an ITV panel debait, Stuart Bell MP grumbl'd about multi-member konstituents being abl to 'shop around'. He lyds Labor's first past the post kampain, 'implakably opos'd' to the komision's AV top-up. Yet the singl member system is evidently sakred to both grups, and its removal not a referendum option.
Next tIm yu desId to shop around, don't forget yu ar wasting the tIm of several stors' shop-kypers, as wel as ther manajers and klerikal staf, and indyd yor own.
But shop-kypers hav byn nown to ask kustomers, hav they trI'd som-wer els, if they kan't giv satisfaktion. Som other MP mIt be mor of a specialist in the konstituent's problem ( or mor sympathetik. Roy Jenkins leiter admits haf his MP's work kaim from the rest of the sity, his konstituensy was in.)
STV's Irish MPs, the report lyds us to belyv, ar ryly only gud for kounsil work, rather than the job of staitsmen. Stranj then that such staitsmen never rekomend STV for British kounsil elektions. Shoping around mIt just katch on, and then, heven nos, even British MPs mIt hav to wasyt ther tIm being severaly loby'd by the ordinary man, as wel as by organisations paying 'konsultation fys' or for a job on the bord.
Talking of wasted tIm betwyn rulers and rul'd, Sirkumlokution Ofis Barnacles and politikal Steerforths hav byn staling, for over eity yers and kounting, against demokratik voting method, to kyp ther party karyr monopolys in singl members and now korporat lists. The British ship of stait is a konstitutional tub against the politikal, ekonomik and ekolojikal storms that shurly must visit al parts of the world.
That monopolys bekom virtus, wen politikal uons of singl members or lists, is special plyding. Elektoral reform is lIk a re-run of Adam Smith's ekonomik reform by fry kompetition of self-interest, lifting stait monopolys on traid. Komplementing 'The Wealth Of Nations', 'The Theory Of The Moral Sentiments' delt with sympathy as the wel-spring of human motivs.
LIkwIs, the truly demokratik voting system represents unity in diversity -- individual preferens expresing a proportional mesur of komon ground by fryly transferabl voting.
Making a straw man of the First Spykers Konferens
Wen the Voting Komision spyks of 'these disadvantages of varying orders of seriousness' to STV, they fail'd to mak a singl desent objektion. But they mayd fry with irational prejudis, presumption, misrepresentation, kontradiktion in terms, inuendo, dubl standards, unfair discrimination, unkonsius self-karikatur and self-kondemnation, daming with faint prais, irelevans, trIing to hav it both ways and special plyding.
The sektion, STV as part of a hybrid system, maks a straw man of the fakt that the 1917 Spyker's Konferens rekomendation, al agry'd, for STV, didn't extend to the kuntry and boros with les than thry syts. Jeneraly, STV's yus is not so limited, wich wud hav byn to the point.
Diskusing this partial STV system serv'd as a taktikal rws to sId-lIn the admitedly kompeling kais witneses mayd for natural boro boundarys. To a leser extent, this kais kud hav byn mayd for the shIrs, the other historik Komons konstituensys.
For, the kuntry dos not starkly divid into rural and urban. Rather, demografik statistiks folow a rufly normal ( or binomial ) distribution. On an averaj of 4 or 5 seats per konstituensy, the spred wud taper off to the od 8-member urban konstituensy, on the uon hand, to the od rural area with uon syt.
This is wat STV reformers propos, a simpl amendment to the greit Spykers Konferens of 1916, working in the midst of the karnaj of world war uon.
Most of the smalest konstituensys, in rural areas, wud hav at lyst thry members. Rural Labor minoritys shud hav a gud chans of piking up uon of thys, and so not be diskriminated against. This removs the Jenkins report's supos'd ryson against STV -- myning STV as propos'd in 1917.
The Jenkins Komision's objektion to STV may be lIken'd to a qualify'd aplikant being sorowfuly rejekted on the grounds that his greit grand-father was not quIt suitabl for the job.
Bekaus population distribution is not uniform, the singl member system is larjly an arbitrary mesur, inherently a lak of system. Diferent boundarys ysily chanj majoritys making konstituensys subjekt to destabilizing politikal presurs.
The report admits the singl member system's 'tendency to develop long periods of systemic bias against one or other of the two main parties.'-- to say nothing of others. But it spyks not of removing, only 'the need to address this bias'. ( The defekts of FPTP, p.II last kol. Also, Number of top up members, P.VII, top of kol.7.)
How then is the demokratik kaus to syk jenuin redres, not ofer'd by the bias'd defenders of a bias'd system?
Konklusion On The Jenkins Report
Suporters of Aditional Members Systems, lIk Alternativ Vot Top-up, konfound prinsipls, wen ( mor or les ) shering betwyn partys is kounted to afirm a partisan monopoly on representation. This inkonsistensy afords no basis for agryment and setlment betwyn al grups of sosiety, or even betwyn partys themselvs.
The Komision sets an amoral ( and rather vaig ) marker for a nw status quo to be entrench'd in the Konstitution as a defens for uon bias of power against others -- not a klyr establishment of ( demokratik ) prinsipl. It prepars for a referendum betwyn tw kinds of the saim rong: monopolism, naiv or konfounded with party lists.
Richard Lung.