( Kapital-i, in 'I, myself', now spels Il as in isle or aisle.
Leter y spels ryd for reed or read and partys for parties.
Leter w spels swn for soon. )
Links to sektions:
Tw chambers exist to serv tw diferent funktions of government.
If this wer not the kais, haf the 659 MPs kud be re-hous'd in the
Lords. And al MPs kud tak part in uon or other of tw kurent
debaits, taking plas in tw chambers, betwyn a manajabl number of
som 300 MPs ych. Britain alredy has enuf national politicians.
(The nyd to mak rwm for mor fasilitys in the Palas of Westminster
is another isyu. Sy end-nout.)
Ych chamber kud chek the other's work. But the question wud arIs, wich chamber had the desisiv rol. Haf the MPs mov'd into the Lords kud not be demoted for no gud ryson. Yet, to start a politikly elekted sekond chamber from thys, or other party kandidats not alredy MPs, wud kreat inferior MPs just bekaus they wer elekted to the sekond chamber. It is a wIdspred, but thotlesly arbitrary, konstitutional fix that kondems sekond chambers to be sekond-rait.
As a konsequens, the Plant report kopy'd the bad exampl of kuntrys with sekond chambers having a les demokratik voting system ( myning a party list system ). So, sekond chamber MPs wud hav les elektoral authority to chalenj the first chamber. But any efekt they do hav is that of a les demokratik body, in efekt making the Konstitution, as a houl, les demokratik. List systems ar notorius for being party bos systems, with powerful interests behind them.
Mor-over, this option is bais'd on a rong idea about diferent voting systems having diferent funktions. Ther is uon Sientifik Method Of Elektions ( as I submited to the independent komision on the Voting System ) that fulfils nyrly al, and potentialy al, the rekognis'd demokratik funktions.
Another atempt to pak the nation's sekond chamber with politicians is
to misrepresent them, kontradiktorily, as both national representativs
and either lokal, rejonal or European representativs. Wat is the
point of weiting the deklining nation stait with the other government
levels?
Al this dos is to kreat another duplikation and konflikt of
funktion.
Federal konstitutions do exist but the sekond chamber kud giv no mor than a token plas to the thousands of lokal representativs ( hw ar supos'd to be in ther lokalitys dyling with lokal bisnes, any-way ).
The US Kongres has only 435 Representativs and 100 Senators, from federal konstituensys, wel plas'd as Presidential kandidats. To prevent British federal sekond chamber kandidats making bids for the party lydership, they wud be elekted on list systems, under-mining ther personal authority.
Again, the Konstitution wud be left wId open to oligarkik manipulation from a korporat voting system. As pepl rylis'd ther elektoral impoverishment, the sekond chamber wud bekom diskredited. Both chambers must be properly demokratik, wich kreats no konflikt of authority, provided the sekond chamber performs a komplementary funktion to the first.
Modern siens is neither a dogmatik rationalism nor a pedantik empirisism but a partnership of empirikal rationalism. Theory nyds to be chek'd in praktis. Praktikal work is no longer disdain'd as the job of lower klases. Fysikal theorists postulat jeneral laws. Experimentalists chek ther jeneralisations, as they nyd must, in as larj a variety of special sirkumstanses as posibl.
This is exaktly analjus to the work of tw-chamber government. Pepl kom into politis belyving in brod jeneral prinsipls, wich they syk to implement thru the partys that stand for them. They ar the law-makers of sosiety and ar apropriatly elekted from lokal komunitys, that kohyr thru jeneraly understud and aksepted ruls.
( Indyd, komunal interests, as a houl, wud be beter serv'd thru the historik konstituensys of 'the Komons', larjly shIrs and boros. )
But to no how wel politikal laws wil work in praktis, on pepl from al walks of lIf, requirs ther systematik representation. Politicians, as a body, ar not qualify'd to provid this. ( Okupationaly, they ar a very unrepresentativ sampl. But then ther purpos is diferent. )
The vokations themselvs, demokratikly elekting ther profesional lyders from ych fyld of special expertys, ar the most qualify'd to mak inform'd choises of okupational representation.
Party patronaj is liabl to exklud such as union lyders, perhaps asociated with som embarasing strIk. But greit karakters lIk styl-workers' lyder Bill Sirs or railway workers' lyder Sidney Weighell wud hav byn demokratikly elekted.
Profesional lydership dos not konflikt with, nor chalenj, politikal lydership, wich is out-sId its rekognis'd sfyr of kompetans.
The proportional representation of the ekonomy kud larjly be achyv'd as part of the elektoral prosedurs of traid unions and profesional asociations. Vokational konstituensys mIt hav to be kreated for the wykly organis'd, such as shop-kypers, hoteliers, smal bisneses, fishermen, inventors. Ther vois wud hav a moderating influens on the rich and powerful lobys' exklusiv akses.
I dont supos ther's any-uon nowadays hw belyvs an 'ekonomik parliment' wud lyd to a 'diktatorship of the proletariat' by a workers' soviet. Rusian demokrasy is a tw-chamber Duma and Soviet. I dont think it's as systematik a politikal and ekonomik representation, as the naims of the tw houses wud sujest. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in his 'Letter to Soviet Leaders', advokated a revival of the soviets, that is jenuin workers' kounsils, insted of the monopolisation of the stait by uon party.
The term 'ekonomik parliment' to kom to terms with the most presing of modern problems, 'the ekonomik problem', koms from a proposal by Winston Churchill in 1930. This was taken up by Peter Walker (Lord Walker), in 'The Ascent Of Britain', with the idea of demokratikly extending its ekonomik franchis.
Leo Amery, in 'Thoughts On The Constitution', also advokated a 'Hous of
Industry' and diskus'd the mor ambitius plans of politikal oponents,
such as the Webbs, for a 'social parliment'.
Uon kud ad G D H Cole's' gild socialism'.
Uon of the best erly formulations, in 1920, is by H G Wells, in 'The Outline Of History':
'...a community may with advantage consider its affairs from two points of view -- through the eyes of a body elected to represent trades, industries, professions, public services, and the like, a body representing function, and through the eyes of a second body elected by localities to represent communities. For the members of the former a man would vote by his calling, for the latter by his district of residence. They point out that the British House of Lords is in effect a body representing function, in which the land, the law, and the church are no doubt disproportionately represented, but in which industrialism, finance, the great public services, art, science, and medicine also find places; and that the British House of Commons is purely geographical in its reference.'
Wells also mentions posibl 'labor pyrs', the first of wich wer swn after apointed. Vernon Bogdanor is a modern exponent of the quoted viwpoint.
Macmillan's National Ekonomik Development Kounsil brot together the lyders of industry from the CBI and TUC, chair'd by the Chanselor. ( The politikal parliment had its orijins in such a greit kounsil set-up by William the Konqueror. ) But the big boys alredy hav a platform. And a direktor of the Kounsil had a rather Neddy-lIk aversion to a mor inklusiv ekonomik parliment.
Macmillan also kreated lIf pyrs, in 1959, and lIken'd the Lords to 'a Senat'. Not old aij but, again, experiens is the faktor that points to the sekond chamber's tru funktion and requir'd personel.
Mor-over, a reform'd 'funktional' Lords has a history of kros-party suport, nesesary for a Konstitutional reform. The Liberal party konferens got as far as to debait an ekonomik parliment, elekted by the singl transferabl vot, tho they didnt pas it.
In 1999, 'interest grup afiliats' elekted by STV wer also a fytur of David Sinclair's pamflet 'Putting Our House In Order', from the Konservativs' Bow Group.
Folowing Macmillan, Sir Ian Gilmour, in 'Inside Right', argu'd for a 'publik
industrial forum'. Then, al thos with pay demands wud hav to fais up
to the obvius fakt that ther truly 'special kais' is uon among many.
Al nyd ther own kinds of konsideration, such as to work konditions.
As the first chamber maks the ruls of the gaim, the sekond chamber kud
mediat or refery the rewards of sosiety. A gaim is a kompetitiv
ko-operation.
Thos, hw argu the strong always win against the wyk, ar repyting the defytist douts expres'd to Solon, kreating a nw rul of law in ancient Athens.
An ekonomik sekond chamber shud be a powerful fors for ekonomy, by detail'd skrutiny of government expenditur. The Komons abandon'd this in 1896. Andrew Marr, in 'Ruling Britannia', sIts that, today, bilions ar pas'd on the nod. The pyrs as ekonomik MPs kud help draw the Komons' atention to wastful or unesesary spending.
The lejislatur wud stil be jeneraly konsern'd with over-al kontrol of bujet levels, the basis of its power against royal absolutism.
The sekond chamber wud hav a strong insentiv to ekonomis to help improv the investment and pay in the profesions they wer akountabl to. With open and ryson'd debait for al the nation's interests, savings kud also kom from a much redus'd nyd for lobying and kounter-lobying. Al thos korporat kampain funds splash'd about, ultimatly, kom out of the pokets of ordinary sitizens.
The nation nyds a representativly inform'd, forward-lwking body in a
hI-tek world. Doug Ross, the US Asistant Sekretary of Labor, in 1994,
at a global lerning konferens, estimated only 10% of his kuntry folk
wud be manual or blu-kolar workers by erly in the 21st sentury.
In
1996, Britain's Kampain for Lerning thru-out lIf was konsern'd with the
nyd to kyp up with chanjing skils nyded in the ekonomy.
Douglas Hurd komplain'd of presur grups over-welming MPs' personal
konstituensy responsibilitys.
Presur grups komplain of government
departments being twls of the korporat jiants: non-renewabl enerjy
monopolys, the farmers union, the roud-bilders etc.
Kyping-up kurent stok exchanj ratings may not be in the long term publik interest for quality of lIf. Drug kompanys, to say nothing of the ilegal market, ar profit-driven, as wel as helth-syking.
Konserning watch-dog ajensys, Gordon Rattray Taylor, in 'The Doomsday Book', quots evidens 'so well documented in the social sciences that...who watches over the custodians of the commons is: the regulated interests that make incursions on the commons.'
Robert Blackburn, in 'The Electoral System In Britain', lists pajes of quangos. ( Paid members dont have a politikal vot, wich maks them a demokratik anomaly. )
In this endles miselany of politikly apointed monitors, we ar 'Missing Our Connections' as Sir Peter Parker wud say. Many quango members hav to be paid-for by the publik but ar not akountabl to them: taxation without representation. Direkt ekonomik demokrasy, nationaly ko-ordinated in the sekond chamber, is nyded to yild ekonomik, as wel as politikal, power of konsent to the British pepl.
Politicians, serving the publik interest, ar in a diskrediting konflikt of interests ('slyz') from ther power of patronaj over, or dependens on sponsorship from, special interests. The British Labor party has had this problem akutly, being kreated presisly bekaus its special interest was komplytly exkluded from the system.
The Konstitution nyds to be open'd to al the interests, in ther own rIt, in the sekond chamber, rather than subverted by som of them without it.
Bekoming a politician shud not be an expensiv bisnes but depend on popular suport for kandidats ( say, 200 signaturs, as in Germany ). Elektion campain spending ruls shud level the fyld for the les wel off.
In 1976, I rowt to the lokal Department of Employment sujesting a skym
of 'Environment Employment'.
Shortly after, Mr Anthony Steen, then MP for
Liverpool, Wavertree, introdus'd a privat members Abolition Of
Unemployment Bil (23 June 1976) with the saim provision.
BBC Panorama
(7 april 1986) reviw'd the saim polisy working in the USA as 'Workfare'.
In West Virginia this was suported by the Amerikan Mining Union.
'Welfare to Work' was introdus'd in the first bujet of the 1997 Labor
government.
H G Wells klyrly stated the prinsipl in 1912 ( in a
mislydingly titl'd esay, 'The Great State' ). Members of sosiety hav
moderat responsibilitys for its up-kyp, as wel as a rIt to the
jenerus frydom that ko-operation shud bring.
For exampl, bad housing, nyding repair, has byn rekon'd to be the main kaus of ilnes. This is 'only' a 'social kost' but it shows up financialy as the main burden of the NHS bil. Pepl also lws by days off work.
Ful employment dos not hav to be ful-tIm employment. This also lyvs pepl mor tIm for lerning nw skils. France introdus'd a statutory 35-hour wyk to redus hI unemployment ther and promot work-sher.
Work-fer, if nesesary, so every-uon is employ'd, myns that al kan be represented in vokational konstituensys of an ekonomik parliment. The rIt to work kan so be konsider'd as a 'universal sufraj' of employment.
The other Labor government polisy, of a minimum waij, is the garanty that this rIt is jenuin. LIk work-fer, it is socialy and environmentaly beneficial. A basik inkom to the pwrest is spent on esentials, rather than extra luxurys. 'Ther is enuf for man's nyd but not for man's gryd.'
Welfer to Work and a minimum waij serv esential individual nyds. An ekonomik parliment wud hav the power of kombin'd aktion to representativly promot thos nyds.
By 1930, H G Wells, in 'The Work, Wealth And Happiness Of Mankind', was deskribing the kramp'd and out-of-dayt fasilitys of the British parliment. A wel-nown northern fwd retailer, mayd a pyr, has the irs of Labor advisors for a houl ranj of konstitutional reforms, inkluding a nw Hous of Komons, som-wer in London's old dok-lands (wer the Milenium Dom is now sIted).
It is bad polisy to hav authority al in uon spot. Sins Skotish and Welsh devolution, only the north of England remains 'unasembl'd'. With its old industrial asociations, I belyv this wud be the best plas for an ekonomik or vokational parliaent, either in an existing bilding or purpos-bilt ( but not on a gryn sIt ).
The north nyds a draw away from the over-lowded south-est. With tele-konferensing, a sekond chamber wud be virtualy as konvenient in northern England, as next dor to the Komons, wich kud hav the houl Palas of Westminster to itself.
Evidens to the Labor Kabinet Komity on Hous of Lords reform, 1998, and to Lord Wakeham, chairman of the Royal Komision on Hous of Lords reform, 1999.
Statut law nyds cheking by represented interests. For exampl, the publik has statutory rIts as konsumers. In partikular, the smal klaims kort is supos'd to alow komplaints to be mayd chyply. At present, the juj or arbiter may over-rul thos rIts in the interests of selers' rIts. The misled konsumer kan find he has hefty kosts to pay som defendant firm's lawyer's and expert's train fers.
To remedy this, a vokational parliment is nyded wer-by the jeneral publik, represented as selers, qualifys the statut law for that saim publik konsider'd as konsumers. Thus a definitiv statut law of konsumer-seler relations wud be pas'd by both houses of parliment.
Then, big firms mIt be les obstinat in chalenjing
konsumer rIts. The juj or arbiter wud interpret the statut law
rather than over-turn it, in the naim of Komon Law.
Nothing wud be lost to kais law by this, in the smal klaims kort,
wen the juj myrly sIts som alej'd presedent. Presumably, such kases
ar tu minor to tak the tIm and expens of sIting aktual kais
presedents for the juj's ruling.
Brodly spyking, the smal klaims kort shud be the work of arbiters, hw interpret a tw-chamber konsumer-seler statut law, and the hIer korts, the work of jujes also train'd in Komon Law.
A lot of legal disputs konsern teknikal questions jujes ar not qualify'd to understand. If yu hav an okupational parliment representing every fyld of expertys, the suprem kort, wether or not fuly integrated in the sekond chamber, kud kal on this vital mising ingredient to just resolutions!
In replI to my rekomendation ( The Sekond Chamber of Siens: part uon of this esay ) to the Labor Kabinet Komity on Lords Reform, I was sent a sumary of the government's 'position'. This konsern'd the Komons 'pre-eminens', as in the subsequent Royal Komision's terms of referens. No-uon wants a repyt of the historik strugl for dominans within the Konstitution.
But we shudnt asum ther is only uon kind of pre-eminens that alows of no other. By analojy, over the past sentury, the pre-eminent sientist ( or kind of sientist ) is perhaps Einstein. Ther is a tradition, going bak at lyst as far as ancient Greece, that the kontemplativ thinker was som-how a klas abov the praktikal worker.
Uon kontemporary of Einstein was as greit a sientist, tho an inventor. His advanses ar stil not wIdly or fuly nown. Hw has herd of Nikola Tesla?
Theory and praktis ar equaly nesesary to siens. Uon is not, or rather shud not be, pre-eminent over the other. They ar just diferent kinds of pre-eminens.
My impression of the government's position, in 1998, was that the Lords
reform debait hadnt mov'd on from the Wilson government's 'seraglio of
eunuchs', as Michael Foot kal'd it.
TrIing to hav its kaik and yt it, tu, the government wanted a Lords that
was independent yet subordinat, representativ yet apointed ( at lyst in
part ).
If uon rekognises that the Komons has pre-eminens in the jeneral laws of the komons or komunitys, inkluding over-al bujetary kontrol, the sekond chamber may stil hav pre-eminens in the special aplikation of thos ruls to al interest grups.
Demokrasy is not a luxury for either chamber. For social ruls to be brodly mayd, in the first chamber, and for them to be properly trI'd and tested as they aplI to partikular okupations, requirs systematik tw-chamber representation of komunitys and vokations.
Winston Churchill's 'History Of The English-speaking Peoples' karakteris'd the Lords as the chamber of the greit vested interests of the nation -- 'even labour' as he put it. But the Labor party had to be form'd bekaus it was left out of the system. And this has further konfus'd the distinktiv rols of the tw chambers.
If Lords reform had not stal'd in the twentieth sentury, it mIt hav
evolv'd beyond myrly apointing lIf pyrs, hw hav achyv'd karyr
distinktion.
In this respekt, the Irish Senat, as a working model, wud
be far preferabl to the politikal gosts most sekond chambers ar.
But the British sekond chamber wudnt hav to be on as narow a vokational
franchis as in Ireland.
Milions of British pepl alredy yus the demokratik voting method, the singl transferabl vot, for this purpos of profesional lydership. David Sinclair of the Konservativs' Bow Grup has propos'd STV to elekt 'interest grup afiliats' to the Lords.
Nor nyd we hav yet an other kind of elektion kampain with lIkly low turn-outs. STV is flexibl enuf to kombin usual union or profesional elektions with sending reps to a national body to ko-ordinat the ekonomy. Vokational kandidats on the balot paper myrly nyd show wether they ar standing for the national ekonomik parliment, and the most prefer'd of thos kandidats wud be proportionaly elekted.
After al, the interests MP ( or IMP! ) wud be parlimentary spoksman for a vokation's ruling body as wel as a lyding representativ of that okupation, so such an integrated elektion kud be justify'd.
The saim prinsipl kud be extended to the EU, if uon of the thry European parliments bekaim a vokational chamber, integrated into union and asociation elektions, wen that staij of organisation was rych'd.
If the jenerik term for specialis'd sekond chambers is Churchill's 'ekonomik parliment', the British ekonomik parliment mIt be naim'd 'The Hous of Kalings'.
Uon kud mak a gud kais that the twentieth sentury trajedy stems
larjly from failing to rylIs that both politikal and ekonomik demokrasy
ar nyded for justis and quality of lIf.
This relats to the Royal Komision terms of referens on the relevans
of a reform'd sekond chamber to the Human RIts Akt.
Uon sys a demokratik uon-sidednes ( or uni-kameralism ) in Britain as far bak as 1834, wen a Chartist 'Hous of Traids' was to replas the Hous of Komons. ( Sors: E P Thompson, 'The Making Of The English Working Class'. Ch.16 v.) This kan be trais'd mor or les up to G D H Cole's 'Guild Congress' ( quoted in A H Birch, 'Representative And Responsible Government' ).
Karl Marx's atitud, that parliment is 'the executive committee of the bourgeoisie', linger'd on in Britain, thru the 1970s, with the supos'd TrotskyIt infiltration of lokal Labor partys.
Bernard Shaw's 'Major Barbara' is pyur Titoism of politikal rul by a strong man, skornful of the parlimentary 'talking shop' but with a sinsyr belyf in workers rIts and partisipation in industrial manajment. But Yugoslavia, after Tito, resembls the Soviet and Nazi jenosIds.
C S Lewis said he was a demokrat bekaus no man is gud enuf to be an other man's master. Did history ryly nyd to prov ekonomik justis kan not be sekur'd thru politikal tyrany?
How long is it going to tak to lern the nyd for an ekonomik parliment to giv equality of lobying the politikal parliment? For, politikal demokrasy is also subverted by korporat kapitalism, indyd, the very survival of the planet's ekolojy is endanjer'd by unrestrain'd gryd and exploitation.
Even financial jurnalism is alarm'd. Melvyn Marckus warns ( in 'The Express', april 4, 1998 ) of 'The Fat Kat Thret To The Ekonomy':
The figure of £66 million does, however, raise the question of just how much loot is required to galvanise the chief executive of a public company?...
Such tales merely strengthen beliefs that, although senior executives responsibilities may be onerous, the rewards, in the shape of lavish salaries, bonus payments, barrowloads of share options and plush pension arrangements are, in a word, unjustifiable. Another word is: obscene.
What the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank of England should ponder is how ill-equipped so many boardrooms are to argue against employees' demands for inflationary pay settlements.
The demokratik rIts of smal sher-holders usualy ar a sham. For exampl, nobody vots for fund manajers giving themselvs an inkrys in komision ( on pwr performans as wel ) but surpris, surpris, ther grab gos thru by default.
The law som-tIms requirs kompanys to syk a vot on chanjing ther financial aranjments. Bisy and inexpert sher-holders kan only desId by wat the kompany tels them. An independent Interests MP mIt be konsulted by the publik in such kases.
How hard it is in a usurius and parasitik sosiety to liv in desent
poverty. Every-uon has to hav so much kapital in hand to myt the demands
of every-uon wanting ther kut from every-uon els.
Even the basiks inklud
varius tarif'd utilitys, expensiv insurans kovers, publik and privat
pension plans, and the inequitabl kounsil tax.
Uon polisy of an ekonomik parliment shud be to lower the kost of living (partly thru enkurajing domestik or low impakt teknikal inovations) especialy for pepl hw prefer simpl and independent lIvs to the kredit kard or konsumer sosiety.
I dont think it wud be helpful, at this staij, to atempt to anser every detail'd question of the Konsultation Paper on Lords Reform, isyu'd by the Royal Komision. Many of the ansers wud be determin'd by the brodest prinsipls of reform. But wat, if any, franchis the sekond chamber is to hav, hasnt byn desIded yet.
Politikal apointys or sekond chamber sekond-rait politikal elektions wud pak the Lords with party karyrists, irelevant to the nation's vital nyds.
The last quarter of the twentieth sentury has shown how elektoral reform has resulted in a mes of haf a dozen or mor ( if yu kount important diferenses of detail ) undemokratik voting methods on the British main-land, bekaus most komitys ( as hI ranking as the Lords Royal Komision ) wer mor konsern'd to sekur the positions of varius partys, mor or les, in the elektoral prosedur, than to find out what the voters ryly want.
Party organisations shud not be an oligarky. They ar only uon of the kuntry's profesions, only uon konstituensy, in al of the okupational konstituensys, for the purposes of a proportionaly represented special interests sekond chamber.
Som hotch potch komposition, rekomended for the sekond chamber, wil
only myn the Royal Komision kan't mak its mind up about the prinsipls
involv'd.
The fybl mudl of an elektoral 'system', introdus'd by the
independent komision on Voting Methods, was not wel resyv'd.
That the lIf pyrs must stay on ( and mIt hav byn elekted ) is evident. But ther best servis wud be to point the way for systematik representation of unions, profesions and al vokations.
( Further evidens to the Royal Komision on the Reform of the Hous of
Lords.
Jun 1999. )
Richard Lung.